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Financial liberalization and the lifting of capital market
restrictions have brought in foreign investment and made
more financing available for investment projects, but at the
same time have made it easier for financial crises originating
in Latin America or elsewhere to spread. Such crises became
more frequent in the 1990s, and as a result a more careful
study was made of the impact of capital flow instability on
investment. Hypotheses derived from theoretical procedures
were checked against econometric exercises showing that
capital flows have a positive impact, but that negative
consequences arise when they are volatile. This work covered
a large group of countries in the region.
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I
Introduction
In the 1990s, investment growth in Latin America was
unstable and the investment rate was low as a share of
GDP, not only in comparison with high-growth
developing countries but also when set against the
performance of the region itself in the 30 years after
the Second World War. This performance has to be
viewed against the background of the economic changes
that began in most countries around the mid-1980s, and
that continued throughout the 1990s. These opened up
the region’s economies to trade and international
financial flows and integrated them into the globalizing
world economy.
This process involved the State withdrawing from
production activities and reducing its role in investment
financing, so that leadership passed to local and foreign
private-sector actors. Contrary to what the supporters
of economic reform hoped, however, the liberalization
model has not succeeded in stabilizing investment
growth or the investment rate. What the present article
argues is that, as economies have opened up, the ability
to obtain financing for large investment projects at times
of international financial liquidity, beneficial though
this is, has been offset by the volatility of capital flows,
This article is based on a document prepared to support the ECLAC
paper Globalization and Development, LC/G.2157(SES.29/3),
which was submitted at the twenty-ninth session of the Commission
held in Brasilia from 6 to 10 May 2002.
which can be abruptly reversed because of factors
unconnected to the actual macroeconomic
fundamentals of the countries. This disadvantage has
been compounded by procyclical macroeconomic
management.
This argument and the empirical evidence for it are
detailed in the following sections. Firstly, section II
depicts the new context in which local and foreign
private-sector agents make their investment decisions.
This is followed, in section III, by a description of the
uncertainties associated with structural change that
influence investment decisions. Section IV then analyses
some stylized facts associated with the components of
external financing, discriminating between the volatility
of foreign direct investment (FDI) and other external
resource transfers. Section V explains the mechanisms
whereby capital flow volatility is transmitted to
investment, and section VI presents the results of an
empirical estimation of the investment function and the
hypothesis test of the model, using a specification that
includes traditional determinants supplemented by an
explicit volatility indicator for external financial flows.
Lastly, section VII sets forth the conclusions.
II
The growth model and the new
investment context
From a historical perspective, the turn of the millennium
has seen a major shift in Latin America’s growth model.
The shift that has been taking place is from the so-called
import substitution model towards a model characterized
by liberalized trade, finance and capital markets and by
a reduced role for the State in production, finance and
the overall direction of the economy.
Figure 1 gives growth rates for regional GDP and
the investment ratio from 1950 onward (1950 was
chosen because it is the earliest year from which
consistent series are available). On average, the region’s
growth rate rose from 4.8% in the 1950s to 5.7% in the
1960s and 5.6% in the 1970s. The investment rate was
consistently higher in the 1970s, at 25% of GDP. These
results were achieved despite the instability of the terms
of trade and net external resource transfers, which were
negative on average in the 1950s and 1960s.
In the 1970s the region, and certain countries in
particular, began to undergo a marked shift whose
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causes were partly domestic (the crisis of the
substitution model) and partly external.
The first oil shock and the international financial
liquidity that resulted from it provided Latin American
economies with a respite, allowing them to finance
investment and grow through borrowing. But the
external debt crisis and the reversal of capital flows
–the first time the region had had experience of such
volatility– affected all the countries severely, including
those that had begun to liberalize and whose private
sectors had borrowed in pursuit of near-term profits.
Growth rates in the 1980s, as the countries
struggled with the turbulent aftermath of the external
debt crisis and the commencement of structural reform,
were the lowest in half a century, and many of the social
achievements of previous decades were swept away.
At the same time, however, the transition to a new
growth model was in progress. Henceforth,
governments would look to the private sector for
leadership and to exports as the key to a new form of
participation in the international economy.
Over 15 years have now passed since the reforms
began, and the results have not been encouraging. The
region is still proving highly vulnerable in trade and
financial matters. In only a few countries has investment
increased across the whole range of export goods
sectors,1 while in many others, chiefly in South
America, capital has been directed towards sectors
exporting primary goods or processed raw materials,
whose extreme price volatility is compounding the
weakness of external trade, just as it did in previous
decades.
Furthermore, the weakness of manufacturing
investment has reduced industrial GDP as a share of total
GDP and worsened the sector’s trade balance (except in
Mexico and some Central American countries). As a
result, investment and growth rates were lower in the
1990s than in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, and growth
was more unstable (see figure 1 again), a new factor in
this being the volatility of capital flows.
III
Structural change and uncertainties
affecting investment decisions
In most Latin American countries, economic reforms
began amidst the turbulence generated by the external
debt crisis. A number of the policies that shaped them
were implemented as part of stabilization programmes
(the liberalization of trade and finance, for instance,
was included in the policy package alongside currency
anchor systems), and their short-term effects were
intertwined, producing signals that were sometimes
consistent and sometimes inconsistent with the
investment stimulus.
Although the countries progressed towards a new
economic model, the years from 1990 to 1999 had the
characteristics of a transition period. There were a
number of reasons for this. Firstly, in those countries
that introduced structural reforms in the 1990s
(Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Peru), not enough
time had passed for this new model to consolidate. As
a result, investment decisions had to be taken in a
climate of particular uncertainty.
Secondly, the reforms did not begin simultaneously.
By and large, trade liberalization was the first reform
1 See Moguillansky and Bielschowsky (2001) for a detailed analysis
of sectoral investment in Latin America.
FIGURE 1
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to be implemented, and the privatization of public
services the last. In some countries, the reforms were
initiated simultaneously as a group, but in others the
process was slow and the sequencing changed over
time, making it difficult for the process as a whole to
come to fruition. Brazil and Costa Rica are good
examples of the latter.
Thirdly, reform was not carried forward steadily,
which meant that economic agents had to cope with
changing ground rules; a good example of this is the
tendency of countries to introduce tariff surcharges and
other obstacles to international trade after each balance-
of-payments crisis.
Fourthly, the introduction of reforms at a time of
profound imbalance in the system of relative prices and
great economic instability enabled those industries that
were quick to master short-term financial management
to make speculative profits or survive in the market,
but did not necessarily favour the most efficient
producers or contribute to the long-term strength of the
countries’ economies.2
This response contributed to the crisis of the early
1980s and the rolling back of reform in several countries
(Argentina and Chile were clear examples) as
governments raised customs duties, introduced new
capital market controls and intervened more heavily in
the financial system and in companies with ties to banks.
The combination of an open capital market and
domestic financial systems that were institutionally
weak was not only destabilizing, but called
macroeconomic policy into question and highlighted
the fragility of the reforms that had been implemented.3
The recurrence of the phenomena described (in Mexico
after the Tequila crisis and in Argentina and Brazil after
the Asian and Russian crises) fuelled the suspicion that
some aspects of the reforms had actually weakened the
countries and made them less able to cope with the
economic globalization and internationalization now
prevalent in the world.
The initial deregulation of finance, stock markets
and public services provision created problems that
governments were gradually forced to address by taking
regulatory measures and by amending and improving
laws and institutions. Reforms were reoriented, creating
new areas of uncertainty among economic agents and
preventing them even now from following a clear line
of action.
Financial liberalization provided the framework
within which investment projects were pursued or
blocked, depending on the type of company and sector.
The financial crises of the 1990s involved all the
countries in the region because of investors’ perception
of the contagion risk. Time and again, therefore, capital
flight cut short both growth and investment financing.
Meanwhile, the links between the real and financial
economies have strengthened to such a degree that a
crisis beginning in the real sector rapidly spreads to
the financial sector and vice versa, reinforcing the
adverse effects.
This combination of structural reforms, changes
in the ground rules, capital transfer among sectors and
external shocks of a new kind amplified by financial
and capital market liberalization, and by globalization
in general, not only created a new context, but translated
into signals which encouraged investment in some cases
and discouraged it in others. For this article we have
chosen to look at one of these factors, the instability of
capital and financing flows, with a view to analysing
its investment impact in greater depth.
2 See Frenkel (1982); Frenkel and Damill (1987) and Kosacoff
(1998).
3 For further information see Ocampo, Bajraj and Martin (coords.,
2002).
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IV
Financial flows and investment: some
stylized phenomena
During the 1950s and 1960s, capital flows to developing
countries were associated with international trade
financing or with specific investments to finance real
activities, or they were official funds from multilateral
or bilateral bodies that offset terms of trade shocks. In
the late 1960s and early 1970s, when eurodollars
appeared, the international private-sector banking
system undertook large-scale lending in Latin America.
The external debt crisis and the efforts made to cope
with it, particularly the Brady Plan, gave rise to markets
for debt instruments and to the region’s capital market.
On average, net fund transfers in the 1950s and
1960s were negative (figure 2). When the absolute
figures are analysed, what is striking is not only the
subsequent increase in capital flows, which rose from
US$ 4 billion in 1970 to a peak of US$ 142 billion in
1998, but the change in their composition (table 1).
The share of official flows fell from 23% of the total in
1970 to 0.4% in 2000, while the composition of private-
sector capital flows shifted towards portfolio
investments (shares and bonds), whose share of the total
rose from 1.3% to 20% between 1970 and 2000,
followed by FDI, whose share rose from 25% to 74% in
the same period.
Some 80% of all FDI went to just four countries
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico), although as a
percentage of GDP the impact on small countries was
greater. Various studies (Ocampo, Bajraj and Martin
(coords.), 2002 and ECLAC, 2001) have identified the
motivations underlying the different business strategies
that gave rise to this investment:
i) the quest for competitiveness in dynamic
industries such as cars, electronics and wearing apparel
(this was particularly the case with multinational
companies in Mexico and the Caribbean);
ii) restructuring and modernization of production
units in local and regional markets;
iii) investment deepening in sectors with natural
comparative advantages (minerals and hydrocarbons),
and
iv) acquisitions and modernization in
infrastructure sectors with a view to breaking into
regional markets.
A significant percentage of the FDI flowing into
Latin America in the 1990s was intended for mergers,
acquisitions and privatizations. The estimated figure for
1999 and 2000 is 50%. Company acquisitions were
supplemented, however, by capital to expand
FIGURE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean: Investment
rates, growth and net resource transfers
as a share of GDP
(Percentages)
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production capacity, modernize equipment and
introduce leading-edge technology, particularly in
infrastructure sectors (electricity and telecom-
munications), which helped to improve the region’s
systemic competitiveness.
In Latin America, FDI has been less volatile than
net capital transfers overall, as the coefficient of
variation shows (table 2). These figures are consistent
with the conclusions of the study carried out by Sarno
and Taylor (1999), who found that FDI was sensitive to
long-term structural movements in a way that other
forms of financing were not.
Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000a and
2000b) and Lipsey (2001) also concluded that FDI flows
were less risky than debt or other financial flows,
because they did not trigger crises.4
Conversely, portfolio flows and lending by the
international financial system were highly volatile in
the 1990s (table 3), being repatriated to the countries
of origin not only when domestic conditions were
unstable, but when shocks occurred in other countries
or regions, examples being the Tequila crisis with its
repercussions in Argentina and Brazil, the Asian crisis
with its repercussions in the Southern Cone, and the
Russian crisis with its region-wide repercussions. Only
part of these flows was used to finance investment, as
is demonstrated by the tendency for internal saving to
be replaced by external saving (Uthoff and Titelman,
1997).
As figure 3 shows, there is an inverse relationship
between the volatility of financing flows and the average
investment ratio for Latin America. The period of least
volatility (from the 1950s to the 1970s) coincides with a
higher investment-to-GDP ratio. The correlation between
the two variables is negative: -22% for the period 1950-
2000, rising to -44% between 1980 and 2000.
TABLE 1
Latin America: Capital flows
1970 1980 1990 1995 1998 1999 2000
Total (billions of dollars) 4.2 29.9 21.8 75.4 142.6 116.5 102.4
Official flows 1.0 5.3 9.2 12.6 12.3 5.2 0.4
Private-sector flows 3.3 24.6 12.6 62.8 130.2 111.3 102.0
Foreign direct investment 1.1 6.1 8.2 29.8 72.1 90.4 76.2
Shares 0.0 0.0 1.1 7.6 1.7 3.9 9.9
Bonds 0.1 0.8 0.1 11.5 18.3 19.1 11.0
Commercial bank and other credits 2.1 17.7 3.2 13.9 38.1 -2.0 5.0
Total (percentages) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Official flows 23.2 17.7 42.1 16.8 8.7 4.5 0.4
Private-sector flows 76.8 82.3 57.9 83.2 91.3 95.5 99.6
Foreign direct investment 25.8 20.5 37.6 39.5 50.5 77.5 74.4
Shares 0.0 0.0 5.1 10.1 1.2 3.3 9.6
Bonds 1.3 2.7 0.5 15.2 12.8 16.4 10.7
Commercial bank and other credits 49.7 59.1 14.8 18.4 26.7 -1.7 4.9
Source: World Bank (2001).
TABLE 2
Latin America: Coefficient of variation
in foreign direct investment and net
external resource transfers
(Average for the period)
1980-1985 1986-1989 1990-1995 1996-2000
Foreign direct investment 0.22 0.35 0.23 0.24
Net resource transfers 1.51 0.24 1.45 1.31
Source: ECLAC, Balance of payments in 19 Latin American countries.
TABLE 3
Latin America: Coefficient of variation
in financial flows in the 1990s
(Average for the period)
1990-1995 1996-2000
Foreign direct investment 0.23 0.24
Shares 0.62 0.69
Bonds 0.64 0.58
Commercial bank and other credits 1.03 0.89
Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division, prepared by the
author on the basis of World Bank (2001).
4 The findings of these studies contrast with those of Claessens,
Dooley and Warner (1995), who found that FDI and short-term
capital flows had the same degree of volatility, although their
observations only covered a few countries.
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V
Mechanisms whereby changes in capital flows
are transmitted to investment
In a context of financial openness and liberalization,
changes in international capital flows affect both the
monetary and exchange-rate policies and public
spending, but the way they are transmitted depends on
the assumptions of the analytical model and, in
particular, on how open the capital account is and what
exchange-rate regime is in place.
To simplify, we can start with a very
straightforward general model:5
i = i* + (Ee – E)/E + λ ϕ [1]
Equation [1] shows that the domestic interest rate
i depends on the international interest rate i*, the
expected rate of currency depreciation (Ee - E)/E and a
variable ϕ, which could represent the risk premium
demanded by foreign investors to invest in developing
countries (country risk).
5 The model is based on the work of Claassen (1997) and Krugman
and Obstfeld (2002).
If inflationary expectations Πe exist, i is replaced
by (r +Πe) and i* by (r* + Πe) to give the equation for
the real interest rate:
r = r* + (ee – e)/e + λ ϕ
(equilibrium in the financial market) [2]
where e is the real exchange rate and ee is the expected
real exchange rate.
Then [1] can be written as:
e = ee/(1 + r – r* – λ ϕ) [3]
These equations are a financial approach for
determining the real exchange rate, underscoring the
role that this rate plays in balancing the expected returns
from domestic and external financial assets.
In a small open economy, where domestic and
international financial assets are perfect substitutes, any
difference in the returns from such assets is immediately
eliminated by exchange-rate movements. The
difference in expected returns gives rise to capital flows.
FIGURE 3
Latin America: The volatility of net resource transfers (NRT)
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The immediate reaction of the exchange rate removes
the interest-rate differential, returning the domestic and
external rates to balance (parity interest rate). This is a
short-term model that can explain daily, weekly or
monthly changes in the exchange rate, assuming no
intervention whatsoever by the financial authorities in
the currency market.
From a longer-term macroeconomic point of view,
taking the real economy into consideration, real
exchange-rate movements operate in conjunction with
other variables to balance the market for goods. In turn,
macroeconomic equilibrium acts as an anchor for
exchange-rate expectations in the financial market. At
the same time, though, unless a situation of capital
immobility prevails, macroeconomic determination of
the exchange rate can be accompanied by a balance-
of-payments current-account deficit or surplus,
reflecting a change in net holdings of financial assets.
To complete the model, then, we should add the
equation for the goods market:
y = A (r, m) + B (A, e)
(equilibrium in the goods market) [4]
where y is domestic supply, A is the demand for locally
produced and imported goods (consumption plus
investment), which depends negatively on changes in
the real interest rate and positively (wealth effect) on
real liquidity m, and B is the trade balance, which is a
function of the absorption level and the real exchange
rate.
Lastly, the equation that balances the money market
is:
m = M/P = L (y, r)
(equilibrium in the money market) [5]
where M is the money supply and P is the price level.
This model can be used to identify the transmission
mechanisms (changes in the domestic interest rate,
expectations of devaluation or appreciation, inflationary
pressures and changes in demand) that operate when
there are fluctuations in international capital flows that
ultimately affect the level of investment. The model
works with different exchange-rate regimes, monetary
policies (inflation targeting, money supply targeting,
sterilization or non-sterilization) and levels of financial
openness (controlled or uncontrolled capital flows).
Let us first assume a situation in which the capital
account is completely open and the exchange-rate
regime totally flexible, i.e., in which equations [2] and
[3] are operative. An increase in international financial
liquidity, expressed in a lower international interest rate
or a larger flow of capital into the region, will shift the
equilibrium in the financial, real and money markets
from point A to point C (figure 4).
This new equilibrium entails a larger supply of
money and a fall in the domestic interest rate, the
combination of which stimulates spending. At the same
time, the influx of capital generates expectations of
currency appreciation that will continue until the
currency and money markets adjust to the new
equilibrium (line r
1
) in the financial market. If we isolate
the investment function in the real market equilibrium
equation we get:
I = I (y, r, e) [6]
Both the higher spending and the lower interest
rate are favourable to the implementation of new
investment projects, while currency appreciation,
although it reduces the cost of imported capital goods,
lowers the returns of the export sector, thus discouraging
its expansion. Whether the ultimate effect of the real
exchange rate is positive or negative will depend on
the elasticity and importance of the different sectors
for capital formation.
If instead of increasing, international financial
liquidity decreases and capital leaves the region because
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opposite. If we were at a point such as C, the increase
in the domestic interest rate and expectations of
currency devaluation will create an equilibrium level
at which spending is lower, such as point A, and the
investment level will fall.
If the assumption of perfect capital mobility is
replaced by controls on short-term capital movements,
like those seen in Chile and Colombia for much of the
1990s, the effects of increased international financial
liquidity will be less than shown in figure 4. Controls
on capital movements act like a tax on capital, making
it more costly, decreasing the return on flows and
reducing expenditure. Because the tax is selective, it
does not always affect investment directly. What it does
do is prevent overheating in the economy and the
subsequent adjustment.6
The monetary authorities can also neutralize the
impact of the capital flow by implementing a
sterilization policy, i.e., buying domestic assets to
forestall changes in the money supply. In this case, the
monetary effect of rising capital flows is reduced and
financial market adjustment takes place primarily
through changes in the real exchange rate. The specific
monetary policy response will thus partly determine
the eventual impact on investment.
If instead of a flexible exchange-rate regime the
country has a fixed rate, economic agents will not expect
any change in the price of the national currency when
capital flows fluctuate. In this case, the adjustment
variable in the financial market will be the domestic
interest rate, and in the money market it will be the
growth or contraction of the money supply resulting
from changes in reserves.
Figure 5 shows the effect on spending of a capital
outflow resulting from an external shock (international
or regional financial crisis). Argentina in 2001 is a good
example of this effect. The capital outflow creates
expectations of a devaluation that would place the




. The effect of these
expectations on the line representing the financial
market equilibrium is to shift it upward. To start with,
the initial exchange rate remains at r
0
, below the
expected rate of return of deposits in external assets.
To keep the exchange rate there, the Central Bank sells
reserves, reducing the money supply and raising the
interest rate. Spending shrinks, and so does investment.
Capital continues to flow out until expectations of
devaluation cease and confidence in the national
currency returns, except where country risk increases
because of recession, as happened in Argentina.
Between the two systems analysed, the flexible
exchange-rate system and the fixed-rate system
(including convertibility systems), there are
intermediate cases, such as when the authorities
intervene to prevent the exchange rate from moving
beyond pre-set fluctuation bands. In these cases
adjustment takes place through the exchange rate and
the interest rate. The results will depend on how much
confidence economic agents feel in the policies being
applied. Chile after the Asian crisis (late 1997 and 1998)
offers a good example of conflict between expectations
of devaluation and efforts to defend the currency. The
outcome was an increase in interest rates that at times
exceeded 100%, albeit briefly.
What has been described so far is the mechanism
whereby exogenous movements in capital flows are
transmitted to macroeconomic variables, which in turn
affect investment. The final effect will depend on how
open the capital account is and on what monetary and/
or exchange-rate policy is being applied at the time.
Like political or economic instability, however (see
Pyndick, 1991), unexpected financial shocks increase
uncertainty and make agents more risk-averse, and this
is another way in which the volatility of capital flows
affects investment. As uncertainty increases, agents are
6 See Le Fort and Lehman (2000); De Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés
(1999) and Valdés and Soto (1998).
FIGURE 5
Latin America: Capital flight
and fixed exchange rate
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discouraged from implementing projects and become
more likely to postpone them. Broadly speaking, the
international financial crises of the 1990s show how
important it is to treat uncertainty as a determining
factor in investment decisions. At times of crisis,
financial investors panic and withdraw capital not just
from the country affected but from the entire region, or
from all “emerging” countries. This reduces the
liquidity of short- and long-term flows, while generating
greater uncertainty in the real economy.7
From a microeconomic point of view, the
relationship between the volatility of capital flows and
investment is more complex and does not operate only
in the indirect fashion described for the macroeconomic
effects. Over the 1960s and 1970s, those who claimed
to find links between financing and investment were
divided into two schools of thought: the post-Keynesian
school, which upheld the original ideas of Keynes,
claiming that instability in financial relationships could
make investment and the macroeconomy volatile, and
the neo-Keynesian school, whose formal approach,
based on optimization models derived from neoclassical
principles, did not identify important links between
financing and investment.
In the theories developed during the 1980s, the
“new Keynesians” focused on the study of market
imperfections and applied these ideas to credit markets.
In this way, they came to the conclusion that the ability
of companies to implement investment projects
depended not only on the fundamentals of the project
but also on their own financial position. This idea
provided a new basis for understanding the relationship
between the financial structure and real activity.8
Bernanke, Getler and Gilchrist (1996) analysed the
way changes in credit market conditions amplify and
spread the initial effects of real or monetary shocks.
When there is a shock, companies whose balance sheets
are weakened will have less access to credit than large
companies or multinational conglomerates, a
phenomenon that the authors term “flight to quality”.
The reorientation of lending acts as a financial
accelerator, deepening the initial recession that resulted
from the shock. The same mechanism can operate when
international financial flows are reversed. In this case,
instead of the flight to quality seen in the national
financial system, there is a flight to lower-risk countries,
with similar effects on large companies in emerging
countries.
The impact on balance sheets is transmitted through
the borrower’s higher debt servicing costs (in local and
foreign currency), shrinking cashflow and weakening
financial position. As many companies depend heavily
on short-term borrowing to finance inventories and
working capital, international volatility ends up by
affecting cash flow in much the same way as a restrictive
monetary policy would. At the same time, the higher
domestic interest rates resulting from the contraction
in external credit are associated with a fall in asset prices
that, among other things, reduces the value of
borrowers’ collateral and their future borrowing
capacity.
This leads us to derive the following equation, in
which company cash flow c is a function of spending
y, cost of capital r, internal financing capacity m and
external financing F.
c = f (y, m, r, F) [7]
In Latin America, and in developing countries
generally, the financing capacity of companies with
access to the international capital market improves when
liquidity in this market increases. This affects
companies’ cash flow and influences their financing
structure. The impact of financial outflows and/or
financing restrictions resulting from an external shock
will depend on the level of the company’s existing
external borrowings and on expectations before the
crisis. If the economy was overheating and this led firms
to overinvest, a sudden outflow of funds will lead to
underutilization of production capacity and lower than
expected returns. The deeper the crisis and the slower
the recovery, the larger the losses will be and the
companies will be less able to finance investment out
of their own resources. If this is combined with a lower
external and internal borrowing capacity or a higher
cost of capital, investment rates will recover more
slowly than they fell, so the volatility of capital flows
will have asymmetrical effects.
Reflecting this analysis, equation [6] includes the
direct effect of the variation in international capital
flows derived from equation [7]. We thus get:
I = f (y, r, e) + c (y, m, r, F) - g (u) [8]
where u represents an indicator of uncertainty generated
by the volatility of capital flows.
7 See Heymann (2000) on learning in the expectations function.
8 See Blinder and Stiglitz (1983); Myers and Majluf (1984);
Bernanke and Getler (1995); Bernanke, Getler and Gilchrist (1996);
Hubbard (1998); Fazzari, Hobbard and Petersen (1988 and 2000)
and Carpenter and others (1998).
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These factors obviously do not affect all companies
alike. In Latin America, it can be seen that financial
markets are segmented, owing to the incompleteness
of markets and information asymmetry, and that
companies have different financing structures in terms
of the breakdown among their own resources, debt
instruments negotiated with the local financial system,
and external debt. In general, small and medium-sized
enterprises tend to finance themselves from their own
resources and local bank borrowing, while large
domestic companies and multinationals have access to
local credit and to instruments supplied by the
international financial market: bonds, shares or
medium- and long-term external debt.
Access to the capital flows from the international
financial system, and the reversal of such flows, affect
both types of companies through different channels,
but also have differentiated effects on large companies
depending on whether they are export-oriented or
produce for the local market:
i) Small and medium-sized enterprises: during
crises, the decline in profits (which are essential for
self-financing) is compounded by the constriction of
bank lending caused by reduced liquidity in the local
financial market and the greater reluctance of banks to
take risks. A kind of crowding-out effect operates owing
to the flight to quality referred to earlier. During upturns,
on the other hand, the liquidity of the domestic financial
system leads banks to invest in activities that might
normally be considered too unprofitable and/or risky,
and crowding in occurs. When flows are reversed, the
business cycle is intensified by bankruptcies among
companies that have taken on too much debt and the
fragility of those that survive.
ii) Large export-oriented local or multinational
companies: if the influx of capital prior to the financial
shock led to currency appreciation, the subsequent
devaluation will benefit them by making local currency-
denominated wages and inputs cheaper. This will tend
to make them more profitable, but at the same time
they will be negatively affected by the lack of liquidity
in the international financial market. What this generally
means is that they are unable to raise money by issuing
bonds or shares or by borrowing, or that it becomes
much more expensive to do so, and investment projects
are likely to be postponed as a result. The opposite
happens during upturns, when investment projects
become easier to implement.
iii) Large domestic market-oriented local or
multinational companies: currency appreciation during
the period of international financial liquidity benefits
them and encourages external borrowing. If the
company expects an outflow of external funds or a
possible crisis, it may avoid currency risk by shifting
part of its external borrowings into local-currency debt.
If it fails to anticipate these developments it will be
exposed to currency losses. Meanwhile, its access to
external financing will be restricted, and if there is a
sharp devaluation (because there was previously a fixed
exchange rate or dirty float) this will be compounded
by a large fall in profits, compromising its future
creditworthiness. In this case, investment decisions will
depend not only on the fundamentals of the project but
also on the assessment that financiers make of the
company, which may be faced with a domestic and
external credit crunch.
To sum up, the effect of capital account
liberalization and financial volatility will depend on
how heavily the different types of companies are
represented in the economy and in capital formation.
If large exporters predominate the economy will be less
affected, unless a very high proportion of exports go to
markets that have also suffered from the international
financial crisis (this was what happened to Chile with
the Asian crisis).
It will also depend on how much domestic and
external debt companies are carrying. If small and
medium-sized enterprises are heavily in debt when
capital flows are reversed and spending contracts, they
will probably find it very hard to survive. In any event,
it will be a long time before they are again in a position
to expand production capacity.
Lastly, the scale of the impact will also depend on
monetary policy and the exchange-rate regime. It has
been shown on different occasions that adjustment is
more traumatic for real variables (growth and
employment) when exchange rates are fixed than when
they are flexible.9 While spending clearly has a positive
impact on investment and the cost of capital a negative
one, abrupt changes in the real exchange rate do not
automatically produce a positive or negative result.
Rather, the impact depends on which are the markets
that companies sell to and what type of effect
predominates. If it is the financial effect, devaluation
will have a negative impact. If it is the real effect, the
impact is indeterminate: export sectors will become
more profitable, but the cost of capital goods will rise,
adversely affecting activities that are oriented towards
the domestic market.
9 See Ffrench-Davis and Larraín (2001).
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 7  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 256
INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL VOLATILITY IN LATIN AMERICA  •  GRACIELA MOGUILLANSKY
Future research may clarify the effects of
international capital flow volatility on companies that
have different levels of access to such funding, different
financing structures and different sectoral orientations.
The distinction between export- and local market-
oriented sectors is particularly important.
VI
Capital flow volatility and investment:
empirical estimates
This section presents the results of estimating an
econometric model that seeks to explore the impact of
capital flow variation and volatility on investment.10
The weight attached by agents to the recent past
when forming future expectations, particularly as
regards capital flows, led us to choose a partial
adjustment model as the relevant specification for
equation [8]. The way this type of model estimates
expectations with a special emphasis on the recent past
is consistent with the failure of businesses to project
turning points in the behaviour of key variables, such
as the suspension of flows or sudden devaluation, as
they have tended to think that past tendencies will
continue in the future. This has meant that external
crises have caught them unawares, and in many cases
with an excess of investment.
Because level variables are subject to spurious
correlation owing to the powerful impact of the trend,
differenced explanatory variables are included in the
model estimation.
The definition of capital flows does not include
FDI. The reason is that some of what is recorded as such
is new investment used for gross capital formation in
the countries, and is thus a component rather than a
determinant of investment, so that it belongs on the left-
hand side of the equation rather than the right. The
remainder, being payment for assets, constitutes capital
transfer rather than capital formation, so it should not
be regarded as an investment determinant either.
In estimating the volatility of flows, all net external
resource transfers were included. During domestic
crises and external shocks there is a decline in all
components of external financing, and it is this that
depresses investment. We included real exchange-rate
volatility in the model as a supplementary indicator
contributing to uncertainty. Like capital flow volatility,
it is negative in its effects.
The model also includes two control variables. The
first is the degree of trade liberalization, measured by
the share of GDP accounted for by foreign trade (exports
plus imports). Trade liberalization was regarded as an
essential measure for stimulating exports because it
lowers the cost of imported inputs and capital goods.
Indirectly, it appears to have a positive influence on
investment.
The second control variable used is a dummy
variable for the 1980s which captures the investment
recession brought on by the external debt crisis and the
subsequent adjustment process until recovery took
place.
The model was estimated using the panel method,
applied to a total of 16 Latin American countries for
which consistent variables and annual data covering
the period 1970-2000 were available. Two methods of
estimation with fixed coefficients were employed, the
first using generalized least squares and incorporating
the matrix of consistent standard errors and covariances
obtained with White’s method (1980), and the second
using a consistent estimator for the presence of both
heteroscedasticity and serial autocorrelation of errors.
In this case the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
method was used.
Table 4 presents the coefficients of the panel
regressions on the basis of fixed effects and common
coefficients for the explanatory variables, i.e., on the
assumption that the investment function presents the
same elasticities for the different countries. The signs
of the variables are as expected and the coefficients are
robust when the different methods of estimation are
applied.
10 Although the model explicitly seeks to highlight financial factors
as investment determinants, it also considers other factors included
in empirical estimates for Latin American countries in the last three
decades. See Serven and Solimano (1993); Rama (1993);
Moguillansky (1996) and Agosin (1998).
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The results show that in the region as a whole,
taking the statistical information for 16 countries as a
basis, it is possible to identify the significant impact
that both the liquidity and the volatility of external
financing have as determinants of investment. Variations
in the availability of external capital and/or sudden
changes of sign are captured by changes in aggregate
investment, owing to the microeconomic effect
transmitted by the reduced external borrowing capacity
of large companies, the flight to quality in the domestic
financial system (which results in a credit crunch for
small and medium-sized enterprises), and the increase
in uncertainty for economic agents.
The model estimates that through the direct channel
of reduced financing, a reversal of 1% of GDP in capital
flows results in a 0.64% reduction in investment as a
share of regional output in the short term. If this reversal
of flows makes them more volatile, causing greater
uncertainty for economic agents, the result could be
expressed as a further 0.11% fall in the investment ratio.
These direct effects do not include the impact of reversal
on spending, which is obtained from the model
estimated using the Keynesian accelerator, and on the
real exchange rate (increase in the cost of imported
capital goods). A structural model would show this
twofold impact.
Box 1
SPECIFICATION OF THE REGIONAL INVESTMENT MODEL
I_Y = c(1) ∆ GDP+c(2) ∆ XM_Y+c(3) ∆ RER+c(4) ∆ VRER +c(5) ∆ (OK)+c(6) ∆ VF+c(7) I_Y (-1)
Where:
I_Y : Investment to domestic output ratio.
GDP : Gross domestic product.
XM_Y : External trade (exports plus imports) as a share of GDP.
RER : Real exchange rate index.
VRER : Indicator of annual volatility in the real exchange rate, calculated from the coefficient of variation
in the real monthly exchange rate.
OK : Net resource transfers from abroad as a percentage of GDP, excluding foreign direct investment.
VF : Indicator of capital flow volatility. Represents the annual variation in a moving average of the
coefficient of variation for net resource transfer flows, calculated on a five-year basis.
∆ : Delta operator, representing the first difference of the variable.
Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division, prepared by the author, 2001.
TABLE 4
Results of the regional model for the investment function
Correction of
Dependent variable: I_Y Heteroscedasticity Autocorrelation and
(White, 1980)  heteroscedasticity (SUR)
Explanatory variables: Coefficient Student’s Coefficient Student’s
t-statistic  t-statistic
∆GDP (-1) 0.0076 7.62 0.0077 11.92
∆XM_Y 0.0019 4.72 0.0019 9.21
∆XM_Y (-1) 0.0778 2.03 0.0528 2.39
∆RER -0.0172 -4.21 -0.0166 -8.48
∆VRER (-1) -0.0002 -0.03 -0.0016 -0.57
∆OK 0.0064 4.74 0.0061 11.60
∆VF (-1) -0.0011 -3.49 -0.0011 -5.35
D8189 -0.0186 -2.15 -0.0291 -5.09
I_Y (-1) 0.8262 34.76 0.8111 44.05
Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division, prepared by the author on the basis of appendices A and B.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 7  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 258
INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL VOLATILITY IN LATIN AMERICA  •  GRACIELA MOGUILLANSKY
VII
Summary and conclusions
Financial and capital market liberalization has served
to attract foreign investment and, in general, to expand
investment project financing capabilities, but at the
same time it has made it easier for financial crises
originating in Latin America or elsewhere to spread.
The frequency of these crises increased in the 1990s
and growth and financing were cut off time and again,
with the result that more careful study began to be made
of the impact of capital flow instability on investment.
One stylized fact brought out by this article is that
capital market liberalization led to a change in the
composition of international capital flows into the
region, with the share of official funds falling from 23%
in 1970 to a minuscule amount in 2000. At the same
time, FDI came to form the bulk of private-sector flows,
averaging 40% or so in the mid-1990s and 74% in 2000,
although latterly less than 50% of this investment was
used for fixed capital formation. The remainder merely
represented asset transfers (i.e., payments for mergers,
acquisitions or privatizations), part of a wave of capital
concentration that is taking place in the world. Given
that the region’s investment ratio has been falling in
recent years, it is possible that the counterpart of these
flows –payments to acquire companies– is being
invested outside the region.
The other stylized phenomenon is the great
volatility of external capital flows other than FDI. These
flows come from a variety of sources, including
portfolio investments in the form of shares and bonds,
short-term credits, and long-term international bank
credits (associated in some cases with FDI), and one of
their characteristics is that after being highly liquid in
certain periods (particularly prior to the Tequila and
Asian crises) they have been abruptly withdrawn in the
midst of the crisis, causing serious financial and
solvency problems in some of the region’s countries.
Analysis of the mechanisms whereby the impact
of capital flows and of periods of volatility in such flows
is transmitted to investment reveals that, at the
macroeconomic level, these variables affect the
domestic interest rate, expectations of currency
devaluation or appreciation, inflationary pressures and
the combined effect that all this has on spending. The
scale of the impact will depend, however, on the
exchange-rate regime in force (which differs not only
among countries in the region but within any given
country at different times), on monetary policy (i.e.,
on whether or not inflation targeting, money supply
targeting or sterilization policies are used) and on the
degree of financial freedom (i.e., whether or not there
are controls on capital flows). The way these policies
are combined creates a context of greater or lesser
vulnerability to a sudden capital drought or international
financial crisis.
Besides the macroeconomic transmission
mechanisms described, there is a microeconomic
transmission mechanism that amplifies and spreads the
initial effects of monetary or financial shocks, acting
as a “financial accelerator”. This mechanism works
through two channels:
i) through greater access to cheap external credit
and fewer restrictions on lending during boom periods,
and through the “flight to quality”, i.e., the redirecting
of international finance to lower-risk countries, when a
financial crisis occurs in the region or elsewhere. The
result is a surge in the number of major investment
projects executed in emerging countries, followed by a
sudden contraction.
ii) through crowding out at times of crisis and
crowding in during upturns. In the first case, banks
concentrate their lending on large companies and crowd
out small and medium-sized enterprises, something that
is particularly harmful at times of low international
liquidity. In the second case, large companies’ access
to external financing creates opportunities for smaller
companies to obtain financing in the domestic banking
market. Both the “flight to quality” among external
financiers and the crowding out effect in the domestic
financial system worsen the original recession resulting
from any international financial crisis. At the same time,
excessive borrowing among both small and large
companies at times of strong financial liquidity plays
its part in worsening the crisis when flows are reversed.
Like political or economic instability, unexpected
financial shocks make agents more uncertain and risk-
averse, and this is another way in which capital flow
volatility affects investment. Increased uncertainty
makes them more reluctant to implement projects,
particularly those whose returns are expected only in
the longer term. These include large infrastructure
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projects, which in the days before privatization were
partially financed by loans from multilateral
organizations and implemented by the State as a
component of anticyclical policies.
To understand how widespread both financial
volatility and the uncertainty determined by it are in
Latin America, a panel model was estimated for 16
countries in the region, using statistics that cover the
period 1970-2000. The specification took the form of
a partial adjustment model, the idea being to capture
the learning process among agents in relation to the
expectations function. This is consistent with the failure
of businesses to foresee turning points in capital flows
and exchange-rate regimes, so that external crises have
often caught them unawares and with an excess of
investment. In addition to variables relating to the
impact of external financing volatility, the model
includes those variables that have normally been
regarded as investment determinants in empirical
estimates for the region.
The results show significant coefficients of
variation in the liquidity and volatility of external
financing. The model estimates that, by reducing the
amount of financing available, a reversal of 1% of GDP
in capital flows has the direct effect of cutting
investment as a share of regional output by 0.64%. If
this reversal makes flows more volatile, increasing
uncertainty among economic agents, the result could
be expressed as a further 0.11% fall in the investment
ratio. This still does not take into account the effect of
flow reversal on spending, captured in the model by
the Keynesian accelerator, and on the real exchange
rate.
Not all companies have access to international
financing, and the impact of an unforeseen flow reversal
depends on the size of their existing domestic or
external borrowings, on the extent of overheating in
the economy, and on the monetary policy and exchange-
rate regime being applied when the crisis occurs. The
conclusion this leads to is that the effect of volatility in
international capital movements will differ not just
among companies, but among countries as well.
To sum up, the exercise shows that opening a
country up to the international capital market has a
favourable effect on regional investment at times of
financial liquidity, but that the instability and volatility
of flows makes this a two-edged sword. One way of
mitigating the adverse effects is to erect barriers to
capital inflows at times of high liquidity, to prevent the
economy overheating.11 Chile has done this
successfully on a number of occasions. Another
alternative is to apply anticyclical macroeconomic
(fiscal and monetary) policies, although the scope of
these is reduced by globalization. If the country is
exposed to a liquidity trap, has little solvency in its
financial system or operates a fixed exchange-rate
regime in conjunction with a fully open capital market,
monetary policy will be ineffective and then the fiscal
instrument will have to be the basis of anticyclical
policy. This requires sounder institutions, greater
independence and more flexible fiscal policy than are
to be found today in the Latin American countries.
Lastly, the need to protect small and medium-sized
enterprises’ access to credit at times of crisis suggests
that financial legislation and the role of development
banking should be reviewed.
(Original: Spanish)
11 See Valdés and Soto (1998); De Gregorio, Edwards and Valdés
(1999) and Le Fort and Lehman (2000).
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APPENDIX A
Results of the regional model estimation: Correction of heteroscedasticity
using White’s matrix of covariances
Sample: 1977-2000
Dependent variable: I_Y
Number of serial observations: 24
Number of total balanced panel observations: 384
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-Statistic Prob.
∆_GDP (-1) 0.0076 0.0010 7.62 0.000
∆XM_Y 0.0019 0.0004 4.72 0.000
∆XM_Y (-1) 0.0778 0.0382 2.03 0.042
∆_RER -0.0172 0.0041 -4.21 0.000
∆_VRER (-1) -0.0002 0.0061 -0.03 0.973
∆OK 0.0064 0.0013 4.74 0.000
∆VF (-1) -0.0011 0.0003 -3.49 0.000
D8189 -0.0186 0.0086 -2.15 0.031



















R2 0.96 Average of dependent var. -1.80
Adjusted R2 0.95 Stand. dev. of dependent var. 0.42
Sum of squares of regression 0.08 Sum of squares of residuals 2.79
Logarithmic probability 412 F statistic 1089
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.97 Prob. (F statistic) 0.00
Unweighted statistics
R2 0.90 Average of dependent var. -1.72
Adjusted R2 0.90 Stand. var. of dependent var. 0.28
Sum of squares of regression 0.08 Sum of squares of residuals 2.81
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.92
Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division, prepared by the author.
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APPENDIX B
Results of the regional model estimation: Correction of heteroscedasticity
and of autocorrelation in errors, SUR methoda
Sample: 1977-2000
Dependent variable: I_Y
Number of serial observations: 24
Number of total balanced panel observations: 384
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-Statistic Prob.
∆_GDP (-1) 0.0076 0.0010 7.62 0.000
∆XM_Y 0.0019 0.0004 4.72 0.000
∆XM_Y (-1) 0.0528 0.0220 2.39 0.017
∆_RER -0.0166 0.0019 -8.48 0.000
∆_VRER (-1) -0.0016 0.0026 -0.57 0.562
∆OK 0.0060 0.0005 11.60 0.000
∆_VF (-1) -0.0011 0.0002 -5.35 0.000
D8189 -0.0290 0.0057 -5.09 0.000




















R2 0.90 Average of dependent var. -1.72
Adjusted R2 0.90 Stand. dev. of dependent var. 0.28
Sum of squares of regression 0.08 Sum of squares of residuals 2.81
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.89
Source: ECLAC, Economic Development Division, prepared by the author.
a SUR: Seemingly unrelated regression.
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